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Socrates was the author of a hymn to Apollo and versifications of Aesopic fables. He 
was not the author of anything philosophical.1 Socrates acknowledged the authority 
of gods, of Athenian law, and of his commanding officers.2 He did not acknowledge 
any philosophical authority. Nor indeed did he claim any philosophical authority 
for himself. If Socrates belongs in a volume on Authors and Authorities, that is 
because, in line with the old slogan that ‘For any one pair of opposites, there is a 
single branch of knowledge,’ he can illuminate philosophical authorship and 
philosophical authority by being so distant from them both.  
 
If I want you to accept something, but do not have the authority that entitles 
you to take my word for it, then I must show you the thing in such a way that you 
can see it for yourself. For instance, I might turn out my pockets to show you that 
they are empty. But not all showing is as straightforward as that. Showing you 
                                                
1 The evidence, such as it is, for Socrates’ own writings, such as they were, is 
gathered in West (1972) vol. 2, 118-19.  
 
2 Gods: e.g. Plato Apology 21b, Phaedo 60d-61a. Athenian law: e.g. Plato Crito 50a-
54e, Xenophon Memorabilia 4.4.1-4. Commanding officers: Plato Apology 28e. 
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something philosophical is more like showing you something in mathematics: I 
have to do it by presenting you with argumentation and reasoning.  
 
Reasoning sometimes comes as an uninterrupted monologue, and sometimes 
as a dialectical sequence of questions and answers. Of course, not all reasoning is 
equally happy in either format. Imagine an argument for solipsism which concludes 
with: ‘So you agree then that nothing exists apart from me?’ ‘Indeed, I do agree; for 
you alone exist.’ Or imagine an uninterrupted monologue which argues that the 
only arguments worth considering are dialectical. Sometimes Socrates’ arguments 
verge on such incongruity; for example, in a speech addressed to Callicles at Plato 
Gorgias 486e-488a, he hymns dialectic monologically. More often, however, what 
Socrates argues does not by its content demand exposition in only one format. As 
Demetrius On style 296-7 points out: 
In general, just as the same wax can be moulded into a dog by one person, 
into an ox by another, and into a horse by a third, so too the same material 
can be presented by one person in declarations and assertions (‘People 
bequeath property to their children, but they do not bequeath with it the 
knowledge of handling their bequest’—this kind of expression is called 
Aristippean), while another will put forward the same material by way of 
insinuation, as often in Xenophon (such as ‘For people should bequeath to 
their children, not only property, but also the knowledge of handling it’), 
while what is called the distinctively Socratic kind (of which Aeschines and 
Plato are thought to be the greatest afficionados) would transform the 
material we have described into questioning along some such lines as this: 
‘“My boy, how much property did your father bequeath you? Quite a lot, I 
presume, and not easily totted up.” “Yes Socrates, a lot.” “So did he also then 
leave you the knowledge of handling it?”’ 
Since Socrates’ reasoning could so often be presented in other modes, it is 
consequently all the more striking that, as Demetrius also points out, Socrates’ 
favourite way of reasoning with people should be by getting them to answer his 
questions. But what is so good about question and answer?  
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In Plato Protagoras 334c-d, Socrates asks Protagoras to confine himself to 
brisk question and answer, on the grounds that Socrates’ memory is too poor to 
cope with a long speech. But Socrates’s poor memory, and his consequent inability 
to cope with a long speech, are manifest fictions. The last 52 Stephanus pages of the 
Protagoras are a single long speech by Socrates, as are the 20 pages of the Lysis, the 
23 of the Charmides, and the 294 of the Republic. If you think that a long speech like 
this is a swizz, since it narrates a conversation consisting of shorter speeches, then 
recollect that Socrates often delivers long speeches that are not themselves 
narrated conversation: some examples are the Myth of Er in Plato Republic 614b-
621d, the exposition of Simonides in Plato Protagoras 342a-347a, and the Palinode 
about love in Plato Phaedrus 243e-257b. In any case ‘long speech’ (μακρὸς λόγος) is 
just an idiomatic term for the sort of rambling speech thought characteristic of 
slaves (Aristotle Metaphysics 1091a8-9, Euripides Iphigeneia in Aulis 313): it expresses 
disdain for a kind of speech contrasted with brisk question and answer, but it does 
not really give the grounds of that disdain.  
 
We get closer to Socrates’ grounds for preferring question and answer, when 
we reflect that a long speech is rhetoric, apt for bamboozling a mass audience, while 
an exchange of shorter speeches by contrast allows for pedantic focus on detail 
after detail. This contrast is explicit at the start of Melian Dialogue (Thucydides 
5.84-85), which I quote in the translation of Thomas Hobbes: 
These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring before the multitude; but 
commanded them to deliver their message before the magistrates and the 
few; and they accordingly said as followeth: Athenians. ‘Since we may not 
speak to the multitude, for fear lest when they hear our persuasive and 
unanswerable arguments all at once in a continued oration, they should 
chance to be seduced (for we know that this is the scope of your bringing us 
to audience before the few), make surer yet that point, you that sit here: 
answer you also to every particular, not in a set speech, but presently 
interrupting us, whensoever anything shall be said by us which shall seem 
unto you to be otherwise. And first answer us whether you like this motion 
or not?’ 
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Here the Athenians take it to be a sign of the strength of their argument that it does 
not need continuous exposition before a mass audience to make it seem plausible. 
Plato’s Hippias (Hippias Minor 369b-c) draws the same contrast between rhetoric and 
dialectic, only to suggest that it is a weakness of Socrates’ argument that it could 
not win a vote when presented as a single long speech: 
You, Socrates, are always weaving arguments like this: you pull out the most 
tricky bit of an argument, and keep hold of it, fixing on it detail by detail, 
and you don’t engage with the general theme of the argument. For here is a 
case in point: I will, if you like, demonstrate to you by powerful argument, 
based on a lot of evidence, that Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus, 
and no liar, and made Odysseus deceitful and full of lies and worse than 
Achilles; and you, if you like, take your turn and contend with my argument 
by setting forth your own argument that Odysseus was better. Then these 
people here will know more fully which of us speaks better. 
 
Yet even though Socrates does prefer dialectic to rhetoric, he does not 
uniformly disdain all rhetoric.3 He has different attitudes to each of the three kinds 
into which rhetoric has been divided since Aristotle Rhetoric 1358a36-b29 drew his 
distinctions between epideictic, dicanic and sumbouleutic.  
 
The speaker of a sumbouleutic speech attempts to persuade an assembly of 
the wisdom of some proposal for future action. The speaker of a dicanic speech 
attempts to persuade a jury of the justice of his case, and the injustice of his 
opponent’s. Not so the speaker of an epideictic speech, or display orator. ‘Some 
[speeches] should be persuasive, others apt for display’ (Demosthenes 61.2). 
‘Someone who is not just giving a display, but actually means to achieve something, 
must search out those arguments that will persuade this pair of cities’ (Isocrates 
4.17). The speaker of an epideictic speech does not attempt to persuade us of 
anything, except perhaps of his own virtuosity as a speaker. When he praises 
                                                
3 Much of what follows was sparked by Jamie Dow’s ‘Socrates’ challenge: why 
dialogue is better than speechmaking’, his contribution to the Keeling Colloquium 
2013 in University College, London.  
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Athens in a funerary oration, like those in Thucydides 2.35-46, Demosthenes 60, and 
Lysias 2, the Athenian audience are already convinced anyway that theirs is a very 
splendid city. When, like Gorgias (B 11), he argues that Helen of Troy was an 
innocent victim of force majeure, the audience will be delighted at the audacity 
with which he defends the indefensible, but this will no more shift their beliefs 
about Helen than our beliefs about rabbits and hats are shifted by a conjuror. Or 
again, an epideictic orator might successfully praise pots and pebbles (Alexander On 
starting points for rhetoric 3.11-12), even though the audience remain as indifferent as 
ever on the entire issue of pots and pebbles.  
 
When your speech will not persuade, and is not even intended to persuade, 
then you need not fear that it will persuade people of anything wrong. Even the 
austerely and scrupulously honest can therefore indulge in epideictic oratory. 
Hence, for instance, the speech at Plato Protagoras 342a-343c, in which Socrates 
praises the intellectual attainments of the Spartans. In Plato Symposium 198d-e, 
Socrates proposes a standard for proper praise that his speech about the Spartans 
does not meet: 
In my simplicity, I supposed that one should in every case tell the truth 
about the subject of the encomium, and, with this as basis, we should select 
from the truths about it those that are the most beautiful, and present them 
in the most becoming manner. And I was priding myself on how well I would 
speak, given my knowledge of the truth about praising a thing. But this turns 
out, apparently, not to be what it is to praise a thing well. On the contrary, to 
praise a thing well means offering it the biggest and most beautiful 
compliments, true or untrue; and if false, never mind. 
But not even this more stringent standard prevents Socrates giving, in praise of 
Love, a speech that is, by the most conventional standard, a marvellous piece of 
epideictic.  
 
 Socrates is much more reluctant to give dicanic and sumbouleutic speeches, 
speeches of kinds that are meant to persuade. He gives dicanic speeches only at his 
own trial (Plato Apology 17d); and he never gives sumbouleutic speeches at all (Plato 
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Apology 31c). In a conversation with Gorgias (Plato Gorgias 454e-455a) he gives some 
rationale for his reluctance:  
SOC: So shall we posit two kinds of persuasion, one that gives belief without 
knowledge, and another that gives knowledge?  
GORG: Certainly.  
SOC: So which of these is produced by rhetorical persuasion in lawcourts and 
other mass gatherings about matters of justice and injustice? The one which 
gives belief without knowledge, or the one which gives knowledge?  
GORG: Obviously, Socrates, the one which gives belief.  
SOC: Rhetoric, it therefore seems, produces persuasion that gives belief, 
rather than instruction, about what is or isn’t just.  
GORG: Yes.  
SOC: So the rhetorician has no capacity to instruct lawcourts and other mass 
gatherings about justice and injustice; his capacity is only to persuade. For 
one could hardly instruct so big a mass gathering on such large matters in a 
little time.  
GORG: Certainly not.  
 
 It is no accident that an orator in democratic Athens cannot hope to instruct 
a jury, but at best to persuade it without imparting knowledge. The jury was to be 
representative of the entire citizen body; there was no appeal from it to any higher 
authority, and it was addressed as ‘O men of Athens’, the term also used to address 
the entire Assembly. The entire citizen body of Athens was thought to amount to 
‘more than thirty thousand’ (Plato Symposium 175e, Aristophanes Ecclesiazousai 
1132). Quite how big a sample it takes to be representative of such a body depends 
of course on how closely we want the sample to match the body as a whole, and on 
how confident we want to be of that match. For example, statisticians often want to 
be at least 95% confident that the sample diverges from the population as a whole 
by less than 5%. If that is what we want—and for decisions with grave consequences 
we may well want more—then, as a matter of mathematical fact, our juries will have 
to contain at least 379 jurors. In Athens, they standardly contained at least 500; and 
for particularly important cases they might contain a multiple of 500. These large 
juries had to decide many cases (e.g. Aristophanes Clouds 206-08, Peace 503-05 and 
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Wasps passim); and this too can hardly be avoided in a city with a large population of 
equals, subject to the rule of law, and not divided into the retinues of a handful of 
competing magnates. Many cases, each of which must be tried by a large jury, 
means that, if the citizens are to have enough time for other activities, there must 
be severe limitations on the time that a trial can take. And it is this fact—one might 
call it the transcendental deduction of the water clock—which ensures that dicanic 
oratory cannot reasonably hope to achieve the good kind of persuasion, the kind 
that imparts knowledge.  
 
 Here then is a reason for Socrates to shun dicanic oratory so far as lies in his 
power. And that will mean never bringing prosecutions against others. But it was 
not in his power to guarantee that others would never bring prosecutions against 
him. And, as a citizen law-abiding to the point of pedantry, he would have felt 
obliged, when prosecuted, to attend court and offer a defence. So Socrates 
eventually had to produce dicanic oratory. But while Socratic principles allowed his 
epideictic to meet the common standards for good epideictic, they required of him 
an unusual form of dicanic. He was reluctant to aim at the persuasion that results in 
mere belief without knowledge, even when the mere belief in which it results is a 
true belief. For there are things that speakers do in law courts that impart no 
knowledge but that might get people to form beliefs. In Plato’s Apology Socrates 
mentions two, and declares that the court cannot expect either from him: stylish 
speech (17b-c), and a parade of sorrowing dependents (34c). If I am defending 
myself against criminal charges, then stylish speech or weeping children are simply 
not evidence that I am innocent—except of course in the unlikely circumstance that 
the crime with which I am charged is that of never speaking stylishly, or having 
uniformly dry-eyed children. So there is no need of such things. In fact, there is 
every need not to have such things: for a juror who sees my children weep, and on 
that basis concludes that I am innocent of corrupting the young men, has had his 
judgement corrupted. A good juror must instead ‘focus simply and solely on the one 
question: is what I am saying just or not? For that is the virtue of a judge, as it is the 
virtue of a speaker to tell the truth’ (18a). So whereas Socrates’ epideictic oratory 
might look pretty much like other people’s epideictic oratory, his dicanic oratory is 
going to look much more austere.  
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 What about sumbouleutic oratory? Well, we can dream, as Socrates does in 
Plato Gorgias 504c-e, of an austere oratory that addresses the Assembly, making 
them just and sensible. But we can do no more than dream. Austere oratory before 
the Assembly is no more likely to be effective than austere oratory before a jury. 
And even if an orator deploys all manner of embellishments he is as liable to 
antagonise the Assembly as to mollify it. According to Ronald A. Knox’s study of 41 
of those who were most active in Athenian politics, ‘only 19, less than half, avoid 
some kind of political catastrophe at the hands of (or, in the case of voluntary exile, 
because of fear of) their fellow citizens.’4 Now these 41 were all more eager to please 
the demos than Socrates would have been. If those eager to please had a greater 
than even chance of coming to a sticky end, how much more likely is it that 
Socrates would have done so too? Socrates is not exaggerating when he says in Plato 
Apology 31d: ‘if I had tried to take part in politics, I would have been killed long ago.’ 
So a Socrates will avoid sumbouleutic oratory as far as possible. And that means 
completely. For while he might be prosecuted and so have to speak in a court, there 
is no way that he can be forced to speak in the Assembly.  
 
 Socrates therefore does not uniformly disdain all rhetoric. And even if he 
did, that would not explain his preference for question-and-answer dialectic. For 
question-and-answer dialectic is not the only alternative to addressing a large 
audience continuously for a time limited by the waterclock. Another alternative 
would be addressing a small audience continuously for an unlimited time. We might 
call this Mr Gladstone’s alternative, in memory of Queen Victoria’s complaint that 
even in a private audience ‘Mr Gladstone addresses me as if I were a public meeting.’ 
We still need to explain why Socrates does not take Mr Gladstone’s alternative. Why 
insist on question-and-answer? And if question-and-answer is the best way to 
expound thoughts, why must the person who gives the answers be different from 
                                                
4 Knox (1985) 143. Knox’s figures exclude both assassinations by oligarchs, like those 
mentioned in Thucydides 8.65.2, and executions by the demos of more obscure 
politicians, like the six generals mentioned in Xenophon History of Greece 1.7.34 and 
the nine treasury officials mentioned in Antiphon 5.69.  
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the person who asks the questions? As Callicles asks Socrates in Plato Gorgias 505d: 
‘Couldn’t you go through the argument yourself, whether asserting it all by yourself 
or giving answers to yourself?’ Why is that when, at Plato Gorgias 506c-507c, 
Socrates presents his argument by putting questions to himself, and answering 
them himself, he would much rather have Callicles do the answering? Or, to put the 
same question another way round, what do Callicles and others hope to avoid by not 
answering? Note how Callicles remains silent while in Plato Gorgias 515c Socrates 
says to him: 
By this stage, haven’t we often agreed that this is how a statesman must act? 
Have we agreed it, or haven’t we? Answer. ‘We have agreed.’ I will answer on 
your behalf.  
Note again how Protagoras moves from saying yes, to nodding, to just about 
nodding, to complete lack of response, during the concluding exchange from Plato 
Protagoras 360c-d:  
 ‘But manliness,’ I [Socrates] said, ‘is opposite to cowardice.’  
 He [Protagoras] said it was.  
 ‘And wisdom about what is and isn’t scary is opposite to ignorance 
about these things?’  
 At this point too, he still nodded his assent.  
 ‘And ignorance about these things is cowardice?’ 
 At this point, he just about managed to nod his assent. 
 ‘So wisdom about what is and isn’t scary is manliness, being opposite 
to ignorance about these things?’  
 At this point, he refused to nod his assent any longer; he just kept 
silent.  
 And I said ‘What’s up, Protagoras? You are not saying yes in answer 
to my questions, and not saying no either?’  
 ‘Finish it off yourself,’ said he.  
Note finally how at Plato Gorgias 506c Callicles tells Socrates: 
 Do the talking yourself, there’s a good chap, and finish things off.  
Why should it so matter to Socrates and his interlocutors which of them, Socrates or 
interlocutor, answers his questions? 
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 In the first place, when people explicitly state things for themselves, that 
can turn our—and their—beliefs or suspicions into certain knowledge. There is a 
neat example in Much Ado About Nothing. Beatrice and Benedick have met only to 
exchange insults. But Benedick is starting to suspect that he loves Beatrice, and, 
because of what his friends say, to suspect that Beatrice loves him. And her position 
is of course a mirror of his: Beatrice is starting to suspect that she loves Benedick, 
and, because of what her friends say, to suspect that Benedick loves her. Then they 
tell one another that they love one another. Before, they just suspected; now, they 
know. Likewise, when in Plato Gorgias 453b-c Socrates interrogates Gorgias:  
As for what this rhetorical persuasion is that you’re talking of, and what the 
subjects are on which it is persuasion, I have no clear knowledge, as you 
should be well aware, though I do have my suspicions about what you’re 
talking of, and its subjects. All the same, I will nevertheless ask you what you 
say this persuasion is that depends on rhetoric, and what you say its subjects 
are. Now, given that I have my own suspicions, what will be the point of my 
asking you, rather than speaking myself? It won’t be for your sake, but for 
the sake of the argument, for it to progress in such a way as to make it as 
plain as possible to us what it is an argument about. 
Here it is evident that nothing other than Gorgias’ own answer to this question will 
do.  
 
 In the second place, even when both parties already know a fact, an explicit 
declaration can turn their separate knowledge into what is called common 
knowledge5 of that fact. To see this, let’s change the example. Suppose I have 
treated you badly; you know it; and I know it. So what then is the point in my saying 
to you ‘I have treated you badly,’ when I am only saying something that we both 
already know? Well, we now not only each know it; we both know that we both 
know it; and we both know that we both know that we both know it; and so on, ad 
infinitum. Once something is in this way common knowledge between two people, 
instead of simply being known separately by each of the two, all sorts of new things 
can happen. For example, you know that my flies are undone; I know that my flies 
                                                
5 There is a classic definition of common knowledge in Lewis (1969) 56.  
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are undone; and, to begin with, we each pretend not to have noticed. I might even 
realise that you have noticed, but pretend not to have realised this; and you might 
notice my realisation, and connive at my pretence. But when you tell me that my 
flies are undone, I decide there is no point in trying to act natural any more, and 
instead do them up. In short, when something is known by each of several people, 
but is not common knowledge between them, it is possible to keep up appearances, 
as in the tea-parties given by the less than opulent gentlefolk in Chapter 1 of 
Cranford (Gaskell (1853)):  
Everyone…talked on about household forms and ceremonies as if we all 
believed that our hostess had a regular servants’ hall, second table, with 
housekeeper and steward, instead of the one little charity-school maiden, 
whose short ruddy arms could never have been strong enough to carry the 
tray upstairs, if she had not been assisted in private by her mistress, who 
now sat in state, pretending not to know what cakes were sent up, though 
she knew, and we knew, and she knew that we knew, and we knew that she 
knew that we knew, she had been busy all the morning making tea-bread 
and sponge-cakes.  
 
 When one is not merely the audience of a argument presented 
monologically, but an interlocutor giving explicit assent to the steps of an argument 
presented dialectically, then it is common knowledge between all parties to the 
argument what they all agree on. Thus Xenophon Symposium 4.56: 
  ‘Let us start by agreeing on what it is that a pimp does. And whatever 
questions I ask, don’t you lot hesitate to answer. The idea is that we will 
know what we are jointly agreed on. Do you accept that?’ he [Socrates] said. 
 ‘Absolutely,’ said they; and once they had said ‘Absolutely,’ they all 
kept saying this in unison thereafter. 
And once it is common knowledge that we have agreed on something, I can hardly 
avoid agreeing—and indeed giving my explicit assent—when you put to me some 
evident consequence of what we have agreed on. If I refuse to assent, I simply look 
sulky or stupid.  
 
 This makes dialectical argument peculiarly coercive. It can leave us, as 
 12 
Callicles says in Plato Gorgias 482e ‘trussed up and gagged’. Xenophon Memorabilia 
4.6.15 puts essentially the same point in a a more long-winded way:  
Whenever he went through something in an argument himself, he would 
proceed by steps that had the most assent, deeming this to be what makes an 
argument secure. And that is why, of all those known to me, he got much the 
most assent from those listening. He said that Homer accorded Odysseus the 
honour of being ‘a secure speaker’ [Odyssey 8.171] because he was good at 
taking arguments through steps with which people agreed. 
Here ‘by steps that had the most assent’ translates διὰ τῶν μάλιστα 
ὁμολογουμένων. Gregory Vlastos translated this phrase originally as ‘from the most 
generally accepted opinions’ and later as ‘from the most strongly held opinions’. 
Both earlier and later, he took this phrase to comment on the premisses from which 
Socrates reasoned, and took the entire passage to mean that the premisses and 
conclusions of Socrates’ arguments were particularly uncontroversial.6 As Vlastos 
himself acknowledged, this interpretation makes Xenophon look silly: for how 
could Xenophon have thought that Socrates’ conclusions were uncontroversial, or 
that reasoning from uncontroversial premisses cannot lead to controversial 
conclusions? We can be kinder to Xenophon if we interpret him as talking instead of 
how, at each step of the argument, Socrates compels the interlocutor to signal his 
assent.  
 
 There is one way to answer Socrates’ questions without getting trussed and 
gagged. It is to answer the questions, while making it clear that one does not mean 
one’s answers seriously, that one gives them only to please—or to humour—the 
questioner. Callicles often does this in Plato’s Gorgias: 
CAL: For quite some time now, Socrates, I have been signalling agreement as 
I listen to you. I am conscious that, if anyone ever grants you anything, even 
in play, you delight in seizing on it, as if you were a youngster. (499b)  
… 
CAL: Let’s grant you that, so that you can finish the argument. (510a)  
                                                
6 Vlastos (1983), reprinted in Fine (1999) 36-63 (which translates ‘most generally 
accepted’ on p. 49), and much revised as Chapter 1 of Vlastos (1994) (which 
translates ‘most strongly held’ on p. 14). 
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… 
SOC: Are we to lay it down that this is so?  
CAL: Indeed we are, if that is what you find more pleasant. (514a)  
… 
SOC: Do you think this, or don’t you?  
CAL: Indeed I do—that’s to gratify you. (516b)  
It is in the same spirit that Thrasymachus says this to Socrates in Plato Republic 
350e:  
So either you let me have my say; or, if you want to ask questions, ask away—
and I will say ‘Right ho!’ and nod and shake my head, as one does to old 
biddies when they are telling their tales.  
The idea is to spoil Socrates’ victory by making it look easy.  
 
 There is a comparison and a contrast to be drawn with an incident in 
Chapter 33 of  Catch 22 (Heller (1961)), when some Americans try to force an Italian 
to say uncle, that is, to acknowledge that they have her beat:  
 ‘Say uncle,’ they said to her. 
 ‘Uncle,’ she said. 
 ‘No, no. Say uncle.’ 
 ‘Uncle,’ she said. 
 ‘She still doesn’t understand.’ 
 ‘You still don’t understand, do you? We can’t really make you say 
uncle unless you don’t want to say uncle. Don’t you see? Don’t say uncle 
when I tell you to say uncle. Okay? Say uncle.’ 
 ‘Uncle,’ she said. 
 ‘No, don’t say uncle. Say uncle.’ 
 She didn’t say uncle. 
 ‘That’s good!’ 
 ‘That’s very good.’ 
 ‘It’s a start. Now say uncle.’ 
 ‘Uncle,’ she said. 
 ‘It’s no good.’ 
The Americans are not satisfied when the Italian promptly says uncle. So too 
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Socrates is not satisfied when Thrasymachus and Callicles promptly agree with him. 
That is the comparison. The contrast is that because the Italian has absolutely no 
concern for or even awareness of the kind of victory that the Americans seek, she 
effortlessly makes the Americans’ victory worthless, whereas Thrasymachus and 
Callicles, in striving to engineer the effect that the Italian accomplished so 
effortlessly, betray their fear that they will otherwise suffer an overtly humiliating 
defeat. In consequence, when Socrates reduces people to saying ‘I will answer this 
way, but only to humour you,’ he has a victory of sorts. But his victory is not as 
comprehensive as it would be if the interlocutors engaged more seriously in the 
contest.  
 
 How then can Socrates get people, not merely to offer answers to his 
questions, but to offer them in a suitably serious spirit? Seriousness can have no 
simple warrant. If it did, Socrates could not so easily be suspected of teasing and 
dissimulation. But there are verbal devices that come as close as any verbal device 
can to ensuring seriousness, and Socrates makes ready use of such devices. Thus 
Socrates invokes the name of Zeus, God of Friendship, to ask Euthyphro and 
Callicles to be serious (Plato Euthyphro 6b, Gorgias 500b, 519e), just as he invokes the 
same name to assure Alcibiades of his own seriousness (Plato Alcibiades 109d), and 
just as Phaedrus invokes the same name to ask him to be serious (Plato Phaedrus 
234e). Another such device is switching from first or second person pronouns to 
using someone’s name and title in a third person statement, as if solemnly minuting 
a declaration of his. Thus there is this exchange between Socrates and Callicles in 
Plato Gorgias 495d-e:  
SOC: Come now, let us make a mental note of this: Callicles, from the deme of 
Acharnae, said that pleasant and good are the same thing, and that 
knowledge and manliness are different both from one another and from the 
good.  
CAL: But does Socrates from the deme of Alopeke agree or not agree with us 
on these points? 
SOC: He does not agree. And I think that Callicles will not agree either, once 
he has a proper view of himself.  
Socrates uses the same device in two remarks from Plato’s Alcibiades Major, both 
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addressed to Alcibiades:  
So it was stated that, on questions of justice and injustice. Alcibiades the 
Handsome, the son of Cleinias, has no knowledge, though he thinks he does, 
and is going to go to the Assembly to advise the Athenians about something 
about which he knows nothing? Wasn’t that it? (113b) 
Alcibiades the son of Cleinias has not had, so it seems, and does not have 
now, any lover apart from one alone, and that, one with whom he has to be 
content, Socrates the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete. (131e)  
In Plato Theaetetus 160d-e, Socrates uses a modest form of this device to Theaetetus, 
whose proposal that knowledge is perception he enters into the record using only 
the name ‘Theaetetus’. It is those more slippery than Theaetetus who need also 
demotics and patronymics to ensure their seriousness.  
 
 Suppose that by these or other means Socrates does extract serious answers, 
and that his interlocutor does get trussed and gagged, that is, does get rendered 
incapable of denying the point for which Socrates is arguing. This does not yet 
mean that Socrates has proved that point to the interlocutor. For assent can be 
extorted by dialectical argument, without persuasion of any kind, let alone the kind 
that imparts knowledge. In Plato Republic 487b-c, Adeimantus points this out, 
making a beautiful comparison between losing in dialectic and losing in a board 
game like chess or draughts:  
Socrates, nobody could contradict you on these points. But the fact is that 
whenever people hear you say what you’re saying now, it has the following 
effect on them: they suppose that because they have no experience of 
question and answer, they get led astray by the argument, a little bit astray 
at each question; and when the little bits are put together at the end of the 
argument, their error turns out massive, quite the opposite of what they said 
at first. Just as, at the end of a game, people who are skilled at petteia leave 
those who are unskilled blocked in and unable to move, so too, at the end of 
a discussion, people feel blocked in and unable to speak, because of this 
other, as it were, petteia, played not with counters but with words. This is 
because they think that the truth is, for all that they have been defeated, not 
any more as you say. 
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The beauty of this comparison is how it demonstrates that reluctance to believe in 
your heart what you have been forced to accept with your lips need not be a sign of 
perversity. For if you lack skill in the board game, then you might lose from a 
position from which you could have forced a win, had you but known how. And if 
you are wise enough to be aware of your lack of skill, then you will rightly allow 
that perhaps it, rather than any objective deficiency in the position you had to start 
with, explains your defeat.  
 
 However, even if the argument does not prove to the interlocutor its 
ostensible conclusion, it still proves something. For it proves that, whether or not 
the interlocutor is perverse in refusing to believe the ostensible conclusion, there is 
something wrong with the interlocutor somewhere. For if you are now right in 
refusing to believe what you are forced to say at the final stage of the argument, 
then you were wrong at earlier stages, either in the premisses you accepted, or in 
the inferences you made from them, or both. And this you can hardly deny, 
however complacently you may insist that you could easily have done better. For 
example, in Plato’s Hippias Major, even Hippias has to acknowledge that he has been 
shown up, although he tries to minimise this by suggesting that he could easily do 
better if given a bit more time to think, unharrassed by Socrates’ questions:  
SOC: But, comrade, let’s not give up just yet. For I still have some hope of 
making it clear just what the beautiful is.  
HIP: Of course, Socrates; that’s not hard to discover. For I know well that if I 
had a short while in private to look at it by myself, I could tell you it more 
exactly than exactness in its entirety. (295a) 
…  
SOC: As for me, I’ve no idea any longer where to turn; I’m at a dead end. But 
what about you? Can you say anything?  
HIP: Not just at the moment; but, as I was saying just now, once I have had a 
look, I know I will discover it. (297d-e) 
Hippias has his pride, and that stops him acknowledging quite how deep are the 
roots of his failure to understand the beautiful. But that he suffers from some such 
failure is guaranteed by the fact that he has been dialectically compelled to admit to 
some such failure. For if it is dialectical compulsion, and not merely, for example, a 
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wish to be agreeable, that leads to the admission, then he thinks, and does not 
merely say, that there is something wrong with his thoughts about the beautiful. 
And if he thinks that there is something wrong with them, then there is something 
wrong with them. The logic here is akin to the Epimenides: once a Cretan tells us 
that we cannot always believe everything that a Cretan tells us, then it is bound to 
be true that we cannot always believe everything that a Cretan tells us.  
 
 There are no doubt all sorts of other ways to demonstrate that Hippias has 
only a faulty understanding of the beautiful. When Socrates demonstrates it by 
dialectically compelling him to admit it, the demonstration has a special merit that 
not all others share. For the demonstration is a demonstration, not just to the wise, 
or to ideal pupils, but to Hippias himself. For Hippias himself now comes to know 
what he has been forced to admit. And only his own admission can give him this 
knowledge. The united assurances of others could not. In Plato Gorgias 474a, 
Socrates says to Polus: 
Whatever I am saying, I know to produce one witness for it, the very person 
to whom I am saying it, and I ignore the masses; and I know to put the issue 
to a vote of one person, but with the masses I do not so much as exchange a 
word. 
This is simple truth, when what Socrates is saying is that Hippias has not got things 
straight. Hippias’ own authority is the only sufficient authority that he can have for 
such a thing.  
 
 There is a further merit to such a demonstration. It not only makes the fact 
that Hippias has not got things straight known to him. It makes that fact common 
knowledge to every participant in the conversation. They all know it, they all know 
that they all know it, they all know that they all know that they all know it, and so 
on indefinitely. Any pretence to the contrary is now no longer possible. This is why 
having your ignorance demonstrated in this way humiliates so painfully that it can 
be compared to snakebite, birthpangs and electric shock (Plato Symposium 218a, 
Theaetetus 151a, Meno 80a), so painfully that Callicles and Protagoras fall silent 
when such a humiliation looms up, so painfully that you might even be motivated to 
abandon complacent fantasies about how wise you already are, and set about 
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becoming wise for real. And all this, without anyone having to take Socrates’ word 
for anything. We can revere him for his philosophical expertise in bringing about 
such demonstration. But if this is his sole philosophical expertise, we cannot revere 
him as a philosophical authority.  
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